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The U.S. Army has used a structured order format and process for more than 80 years. 
The 1924 version of the Field Service Regulation 
prescribed “formatted orders, with annexes, maps, 
and tables.”1 Staff procedures have evolved since 
then, but the basic structure of the operation order 
(OPORD) has remained essentially the same—five 
paragraphs or sections that describe the situation, 
mission, execution, service support, and command 
and signal. The basic process for creating, sharing, 
and using OPOrDs has also remained essentially 
the same and is “time-consuming and effortful.” It 
needs to be revised.2
OPOrDs begin when a higher echelon commu-
nicates its OPOrD to a lower echelon. The lower 
echelon commander and staff review the OPOrD 
and conduct a mission analysis. The lower level 
commander provides guidance to the staff, and the 
staff enters into the military decisionmaking pro-
cess. Typically, the staff presents the commander 
with multiple courses of action (COAs), the com-
mander chooses one COA and expresses his intent, 
the staff creates an OPOrD and passes it to the next 
lower echelon, and the process is repeated until all 
Soldiers have been told what is expected of them. 
OPOrDs are also passed back up for an iterative 
sweep through the echelons and final approval. 
OPOrDs can sometimes be hundreds of pages 
long. however, clear, concise communication, 
especially of the commander’s intent, is a criti-
cal aspect of military planning, replanning, and 
operations. The effort devoted to training in writing 
and interpreting OPORDs in the Reserve Officer 
Training Corps, at the U.S. military Academy, and 
throughout the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 
Command school system indicates how important 
this is.3 having recently evaluated OPOrDs and 
conducted empirical studies of how OPOrDs are 
understood, we propose a change to the existing 
OPOrD format and a new procedure for creating 
OPOrDs, to amplify adaptive decisionmaking at 
all echelons and improve planning for joint and 
coalition operations.
Conceptual Analyses of OPORDs
U.S. Army Field manual (Fm) 5-0, Army Plan-
ning and Orders Production, includes detailed spec-
ifications of the structure of OPORDs. A “good” 
OPOrD is characterized by the following: 
● Military reasoning and operations effective-
ness. The OPOrD should avoid ambiguous direc-
tives and make all assumptions explicit.
● The plan. The OPORD should balance central-
ization and decentralization.
● Communication effectiveness. The OPORD 
should be simple, brief, clear, and unambiguous.4
The Concept Map (Cmap) in figure 1 expresses 
what an OPOrD should be like, but we have found 
that this does not match reality. We examined in 
detail 10 representative OPOrDs, which included 
orders used in combat from company level through 
echelons above corps, and orders used during train-
ing, command and control (C2) research, and battle 
command experiments. The sample OPOrDs did 
not adhere to Fm guidelines concerning ease of 
communication. Statements were ambiguous, acro-
nyms were used even when they were not necessary, 
and sentences included multiple relative clauses. 
The commander’s intent was spread throughout the 
document like peanut butter. 
At any level, the intent statement must support 
the next higher commander’s intent and come 
after the heading for paragraph 3, Operations, 
and before paragraph 3a, Concept of Operations. 
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Paragraph 1b of the OPOrD or operation plan 
(OPLAN) contains the statements of the next two 
higher echelon commanders to ensure the staff and 
supporting commanders understand the intent two 
echelons up. At the battalion level and higher, the 
order is also written to decrease the chances of mis-
understanding.5 While decreasing such chances is a 
sound goal, it is not always achieved. Apart from the 
statements’ locations in designated subparagraphs, 
the OPOrDs were not consistent in presenting the 
intended level of the intent statements (brigade, 
battalion, unit). In other words, the intent informa-
tion was not always in the same place and, in some 
cases, was absent altogether, placing a considerable 
burden on the reader’s memory. 
This “peanut butter effect” occurs for additional 
reasons. OPOrDs often contain expressions of 
conditionality that force cross-referencing among 
intent, mission, and goal. For instance, one OPOrD 
stated: “end state for Apache Company is to control 
key intersections.” It later adds that its purpose is to 
facilitate logistics flow. Another OPORD provided 
a method (“Balanced task force [TF] in the north, 
positioned forward in sector”) and then added the 
intent (“Force enemy into successor brigade east 
along AA1”). Good OPORDs contain sufficient 
information to “[enable] subordinates’ initiative by 
setting limits beyond the established plan or order 
while retaining unity of effort.”6 hence, statements 
in the intent paragraph, expressing rationale, must 
be strongly linked to statements in the mission 
paragraph.
We see here the difficulty of presenting complex 
interrelations among complex events within the 
confines of traditional linear text. OPORDs often 
embed descriptions of conditional dependencies and 
decision points in intent statements. For example, “If 
the enemy attacks solely on AA1, then northern TF 
attacks enemy in the VIC (vicinity) AreA hUrT.” 
OPOrDs sometimes contain information in a way 
that is at direct odds with Fm guidelines. For example, 
the good OPORD is supposed to involve affirmative 
statements, but commanders quite often express “con-
cerns” and “anti-goals”: “enemy control of lines of 
communication could restrict flow of logistics into 
the BDe (brigade) AO (area of operation).”7
These findings dovetail with analyses of Army 
replanning and studies of how the best corporate 
executives communicate their intent.8 This research 
suggests that effective communication of intent 
involves calibrating it by a command-staff dialog 
to ensure that all staff members are on the same 
page. This would be covered, at least in part, by 
the situation paragraph in an OPOrD. A script 
that decisionmaking researcher Gary Klein devel-
oped for the expression of intent also includes the 
categories of rationale and task, which conform to 
guidance, including expressions of purpose, sug-
gested method, key tasks, end states, and follow-
on activities.9 But the Klein script also includes 
concerns and antigoals. Although these are not part 
of the traditional OPOrD format, commanders 
sometimes do have a clear need to express concerns 
and antigoals.
Figure 1. According to FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, the  
characteristics of the “good” OPORD.
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Our discussions of these matters with experienced 
commanders revealed additional considerations. 
Some claimed there is widespread misunderstand-
ing or misuse of the key tasks category. Some see 
this category as the place to convey specific COAs. 
Field manual 5-0 says: “Key tasks are not tied 
to a specific COA; rather, they identify what the 
force must do to achieve the end state (Fm 6-0). In 
changed circumstances—when significant opportu-
nities present themselves or the COA no longer fits 
the situation—subordinates use key tasks to keep 
their efforts focused on achieving the commander’s 
intent.”10
Some commanders also see a general misunder-
standing of the purpose statement, in which the 
purpose statement merely recapitulates the mission 
statement. Field manual 5-0 provides the following 
guidance: “If the commander’s intent addresses 
purpose, it does not restate the ‘why’ of the mis-
sion statement. rather, it addresses the broader 
operational context of the mission.”11 Clearly, issues 
of individual differences in belief, preference, and 
style exist despite Fm 5-0’s goal of serving as clear, 
unambiguous guidance.
In one of our studies, we presented a brigade 
OPOrD to battalion commanders and asked them 
to generate an OPOrD for their companies.12 Com-
pany commanders were asked to generate OPOrDs 
for their platoons. Next, both sets of commanders 
were told that a plausible but unexpected event 
had derailed the mission. The task for the company 
commanders was to go back to the battalion- and 
brigade-level intent and generate an appropriate 
fragmentary order (FrAGO). When these FrAGOs 
were presented to the battalion commanders for 
comment, the typical response was, “Why would he 
do that?” Only one in three FrAGOs made sense to 
the battalion commanders. When the battalion com-
manders’ evaluations were presented to the company 
commanders, their response was, “how’d he expect 
me to know that?”
Cmap OPORDs
As it happens, the features of a good OPOrD are 
also the features of a Cmap diagram. (See figure 1.) 
Cmaps include concepts (enclosed in boxes) and 
relationships among concepts (indicated by labeled 
connections between related concepts). Cmapping 
has foundations in the theory of meaningful learn-
ing, and it benefits from decades of research and 
application, primarily in education.13 Cmaps have 
been used as knowledge representations in cogni-
tive science and are being used by astrobiologists 
at NASA, curriculum designers in the U.S. Navy, 
university professors preparing distance-learning 
courses, corporations and communities of practice 
that share and manage knowledge, and trainers in 
the electric power utility industry.14 
research suggests that it might be possible to 
improve OPOrD procedures by expressing OPOrD 
information using meaningful diagrams. The lit-
erature on diagrammatic reasoning (in education, 
cognitive science, computer science, and geogra-
phy) includes studies of how people understand a 
great many types of diagrams, including topographic 
maps, matrices, schematic diagrams of machines, 
and semantic networks.15 The literature converges 
on a set of conclusions: Good diagrams are effective 
because they can—
● “Externalize” cognition.
● Guide/constrain and facilitate cognition.
● Require fewer “cognitive transformations.”
● Support memory because spatial layouts can 
have mnemonic value (as opposed to overloading 
working memory).
● Support information integration at a glance.
● Reduce cognitive demands.
● Support inference-making.
● Facilitate understanding by shifting some of the 
burden of processing text onto the visual-perception 
system.
In other words, diagrams can quickly convey 
information that is ordinarily conveyed in text, 
facilitate the learning of concepts and relationships 
among concepts, and allow instructors to evaluate 
knowledge (for example, expert versus novice dif-
ferences). Diagrams that work well rely on proxim-
ity; that is, the spatial organization or connection of 
information induces people to see the relationships 
among the ideas and to draw inferences about them. 
Proximity requires coordinating in space and time; 
that is, information that is meaningfully related 
is consistently presented at the same time and in 
spatial proximity. 
These findings relate directly to the human fac-
tors of warfighting, especially information overload 
during periods of stress or fatigue. Therefore, we 
have created Cmap versions of OPOrDs so that 
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viewers can see connections easily. The organizing 
or top Cmap expresses the five-paragraph OPORD 
structure (figure 2). Through hyperlinks (clickable 
icons attached to the nodes), the viewer can navigate 
to and through other, more detailed Cmaps. Figure 3 is 
suggestive of the depth of detail required to Cmap an 
entire OPOrD. Twenty-six Cmaps were necessary to 
capture the entire OPOrD. They covered everything 
from the brigade’s mission to maneuver unit tasks. 
We studied reactions to these diagrams and 
whether the Cmaps supported comprehension.17 
We thought that experienced commanders would be 
skeptical about Cmap OPOrDs because the tech-
nique would not be familiar to them because they 
are accustomed to the traditional OPOrD format. 
however, we anticipated that less experienced 
military participants, such as U.S. military Acad-
emy cadets, would be somewhat less skeptical or 
cautious. younger people of the Web generation are 
sometimes more comfortable 
with Cmapping and take to it 
more easily. 
The first study confirmed 
our expectations.18 The 
results also suggested that 
we reconsider how to “slice” 
traditional OPORDs to find 
an appropriate level of detail 
to use in the Cmap version. 
All participants, inexperi-
enced and experienced, gave 
valuable feedback, including 
suggestions for making Cmap 
OPOrDs a feasible tool to 
use in a military environment.
A second study involved having cadets and expe-
rienced officers read traditional text and Cmap ver-
sions of an OPOrD and then answer questions from 
memory.19 The participants also engaged in a timed 
information-search task. This study design actually 
biased the results against any hypothesis of Cmap 
effectiveness because none of the participants had 
ever seen Cmaps before, so it was interesting to find 
that on a comprehension measure, recall memory for 
OPOrD information was just as good for the Cmap 
version as the traditional text, for both cadets and 
experienced officers. 
Perhaps the most important finding was that 
experienced officers were much faster in reading the 
Cmap version and considerably faster (more than 2 
minutes faster, on average) in searching for informa-
tion using Cmaps rather than looking through the tra-
ditional text version. This suggests that performance 
Figure 2. An example top-level Cmap for an OPORD.
Figure 3. One of the particular Cmaps for an OPORD.
(Specific identifiers have been changed.)
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is not just an issue of modularity: OPOrDs in text 
form are supposed to be sectional. Rather, the benefit 
from Cmaps might stem from their morphology (or 
arrangement of the diagrammed elements), which 
allows meaningful clusters and their relationships 
to be scanned at a glance. 
The results also affirmed that participants were 
reluctant to switch to a new format, and suggested 
that to make a practical Cmap version of OPOrD 
information we would have to find an appropriate 
level of analysis—a point beyond which diagram-
matic representation of meaning uses hyperlinks to 
text rather than to more diagrams. Thus, we began to 
pursue the notion of making templates for express-
ing the commander’s intent, the mission statement, 
and enemy COAs.
Cmap Templates
We devised a template for commander’s intent 
(figures 4, 5, and 6) based on: 
● Statements actually in OPORDs.
● Statement categories suggested by empirical 
studies of effective intent communication.
● The traditional five-paragraph structure.
Figure 4. The Cmap template for intent.
Figure 5. A representative intent Cmap.
Figure 6. A representative intent Cmap.
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To use such templates, commanders need only open 
the template, click on a node containing question 
marks, and type in the appropriate information. Thus, 
using the template does not involve doing anything 
radically different from what commanders presently 
do; that is, type text. The commander can add cross 
links through a simple drag-and-drop procedure, and 
he can easily type in additional linking phrases that 
might be needed (as figure 6 illustrates). 
As commanders become familiar with Cmapping, 
we expect them to use more cross links. But our 
immediate goal is to provide a template to leverage 
the benefits of diagrammatic comprehension. As 
familiarity with Cmap OPOrDs grows, Soldiers 
and officers will find that the regular diagrammatic 
layout has mnemonic value, which might be helpful 
in situations where they have to remember informa-
tion or search through OPOrDs under conditions of 
stress. We have also created a template for enemy 
COAs (figure 7). Figure 8 is an example of an 
enemy COA. We also created a template and give 
an example for mission (figures 9 and 10).
A Vision for the Future
Army missions have evolved during the last 
80 years. The Army is less likely to engage in the 
campaign planning of World War II or the general 
defense planning of the Cold War. The Army is more 
likely to participate in large-scale, decisive offensive 
operations involving coalitions and joint forces and 
repetitive, small-unit peacekeeping missions. These 
operations require efficient planning methods and 
effective means of communicating the plans to 
subordinates at all echelons, across force types, and 
among coalition partners. 
Cmaps are flexible and adaptable. As our research 
shows, Cmaps can easily be set up as templates that 
prompt planners to consider information for the 
OPOrD as well as provide linkages to express real-
world realities, and to coordinate and synchronize 
Figure 7. The Cmap template for enemy COAs.
Figure 8. An example Cmap for enemy COAs.
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Figure 10. An example Cmap for mission.
events and organize the information that command-
ers feel is important. Creating a Cmap encourages 
and supports the clear expression of meaning. 
Commanders and staff officers can insert concepts 
into Cmap templates and set hyperlinks to connect 
with additional Cmaps or information expressed in 
any form of digital media (maps, images, video, and 
so forth). Those resources can provide more detail 
on topic areas such as service support, maneuver unit 
tasks, and so forth. The resourced Concept maps 
could then be refined across echelons.
Patterned after the CmapTools software, the Cmap 
OPOrD planning process could be Web-enabled, 
allowing Soldiers and officers at all levels to view 
or work on OPOrDs at the appropriate levels and 
view intent or mission two up, one down across 
echelons.20 Indeed, it might be possible to avoid 
expending time and effort in developing plans “all 
the way down” and then refining them “all the 
way back up.” A high-level Cmap that expresses 
commander’s intent could be immediately passed all 
the way down the chain of command, “short circuit-
ing” the extended process. Individuals who work at 
lower echelons might be able to begin planning (or 
replanning) immediately. MR
Figure 9. The Cmap template for mission.
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